Operation Mincemeat: How Market Research, Marketing, and Good Analysis Saved The Free World
Operation Mincemeat
Malcolm Gladwell is truly a gifted, talented, and insightful person. He’s a best-selling author who challenges the way we perceive things and does his best to uncover the truth where we least expect it.
Gladwell wrote the best selling books The Tipping Point, Blink, Outliers, and What the Dog Saw: And Other Adventures.
In all honesty, he is inspiration to my own endeavors in regards to what I want to achieve with my company through the development of our product MediaMiser Enterprise and our accompanying services. However, on May 10, 2010, Gladwell’s essay for the New Yorker caught the attention of Wesley Wark, a visiting research professor at the University of Ottawa’s Graduate School of Public and International Affairs.
The essay, Pandora’s Briefcase, was on a very intriguing book by Ben Macintrye called Operation Mincemeat: How a Dead Man and a Bizarre Plan Fooled the Nazis and Assured an Allied Victory. Macintrye’s book tells the true story of how the British fooled the Nazis during the Second World War by planting false information on a corpse wearing the uniform of a royal marine officer. A briefcase was conveniently handcuffed to the dead body and personal letters and effects were placed in the pockets.
The ruse more than likely saved thousands of lives during operation Husky, the invasion of Sicily, and at the same time helped shorten the war.
Essentially, British Intelligence convinced the Nazis that instead of the Allies invading Sicily, they were to invade the less obvious target of Greece. Gladwell uses this story to dismiss the value of both spies, secrets, and intelligence network.
Instead of espousing the virtues of a well-run intelligence agency and the folly of not having one, he chose to use the example of Operation Mincemeat as why intelligence networks are actually a counter productive liability.
The essay motivated Wark to write his own piece, which appeared in the opinion section of the Ottawa Citizen on May 25, 2010.
Wark, like myself, sees value in Gladwell’s unconventional wisdom, even going so far as to complement Gladwell by writing
the world of intelligence and warfare could use a touch of the Gladwellian.
However, Wark disagrees with Gladwell’s assessment of Operation Mincemeat and even rebukes the unconventional wisdom that in the past has served Gladwell, also writing
his unconventional wisdom can be less than wise.
My first instinct was to agree whole-heartedly with Wark – especially since MediaMiser specializes in analysis. But, in the spirit of being open minded, I decided to purchase a copy of “Operation Mincemeat” as well as read Gladwell’s essay.
After consuming both, not only did it confirm my instinct that Wark was right, it also uncovered a point that was clearly missed by both Gladwell’s essay and Wark’s rebuttal.
Operation Mincemeat was not just about the importance that intelligence can play, it also highlighted the importance of having a well orchestrated marketing or communication plan that can be properly analyzed from start to finish.
Essentially, British Intelligence was selling a concept to Nazi Intelligence that they (the Nazis) were in the market for and more than happy to buy.
Gladwell dismisses the whole operation as a bunch of ‘what ifs’ and dwells on how lucky the allies were that Operation Mincemeat didn’t backfire. Also, to further strengthen his own argument, Gladwell even questions whether the operation actually had an effect on the outcome of the invasion, suggesting Nazi high command may have had their own preconceived notions about the invasion being in Greece.
By doing so, Gladwell overlooks the genius of what British Intelligence actually accomplished and not only does he dismiss the obvious value of intelligence agencies, but inadvertently, the value of current day marketing and communication groups as well.
Operation Mincemeat was not just a hairbrain idea that was set in motion by its creators like a toy boat dropped into the currents of a stream and haphazardly reached the intended destination.
The odds of success were stacked in British Intelligences favour, because they were in control every step of the way by having clear objectives, properly researching the opportunity, and constantly analyzing the results and making adjustments along the way.
This is no different from conducting a successful marketing or communications plan:
1) For you to sell a product or to communicate a concept or idea, you must first find a market for your product or an audience willing to listen to you.
This is what the British did: They found a Nazi agent who was looking for something he desperately wanted to believe was true. It wasn’t by luck the false information found it’s way to Major Karl-Erich Kühlenthal, the Nazi agent.
If fact, both Gladwell and Macintyre, refer to Kühlenthal as “a one-man espionage disaster area.”
The British knew this because they did their homework. The planted information wasn’t found by Kühlenthal by accident.
There is even a passage in Operation Mincemeat attributed to Michael Handel, intelligence historian:
It is very unusual and very difficult for deception to create new concepts for an enemy. It is much easier and more effective to reinforce those which already exist.
2) It isn’t enough to find a market. You must be able to package the goods for sale and effectively communicate them to your target audience.
Again, the British did their homework and left nothing to chance. They ensured consistency by going to tremendous lengths to invent a plausible history for the body, placing personal letters in its uniform, forging id cards, and actually having a double agent confirm the legitimacy of the body back to the Nazis.
3) Once you’ve sold your product, you must constantly monitor and analyze to ensure your message was properly communicated.
The British went to great lengths to monitor and analyze how their disinformation was being perceived by the Nazis. They were even able to forensically tell not only whether documents where read, but how they were read.
4) Monitor and analyze in real time and adjust your strategy accordingly.
Again, the success of Operation Mincemeat was not accidental. Some Germans and Italians were wise to the possibility of a ruse. To British Intelligence’s credit, they were able to adjust their strategy with new or modified tactics.
The British used tactics such as creating fake maps, bogus invasion forces, and employing Greek personnel.
Bletchley Park, the British Intelligence’s information centre that was responsible for decrypting and interpreting enemy messages, insured the deception was taking hold by intercepting and analyzing Nazi communications.
To prevent the body from being exhumed from its burial site, they placed a headstone and had mourners constantly visit the site not only as a way to deter Nazi agents from trying to corroborate the facts, but also to monitor the site and make sure nothing was disturbed.
If the gravesite were disturbed, it would be an indication that Nazis Intelligence was skeptical.
5) Evaluate your efforts.
After the invasion, a post mortem (no pun intended), was conducted on the success of the operation. Just like any good marketing or communication plan, it’s imperative that the final results should be measured.
Finally, I find it ironic that Gladwell points out that many of the British Intelligence agents went on to become celebrated authors, such as Ian Fleming.
Gladwell uses this to say that intelligence agents are their best own publicists and have tendency to ‘self-affirm’ their exploits. This is why we believe there is value in intelligence agencies and spies.
However, maybe if Gladwell also read The Irregulars: Roald Dahl and the British Spy Ring in Wartime Washington, he would see that not all spies ended up being world famous authors.
One military intelligence agent, David Ogilvy (founder of Ogilvy & Mather), later became an advertising, PR, and marketing pioneer. Ogilvy was actually recruited by spymaster William Stephenson for his work with George Gallup, where he helped to pioneer polling data. Ogilvy would later use polling data, while working with British Intelligence, to help change US attitudes towards supporting Britain during the war. After the War, Ogilvy would go on to create one of the best known advertising, marketing, and PR firms.
Gladwell finishes off his essay by writing, “the next time a briefcase washes up onshore, don’t open it.”
What Gladwell should have wrote is, “next time a briefcase washes up onshore, analyze the hell out of it and exploit it for its true value.”
That’s what David Ogilvy would have done and this is one of the reasons why market research, marketing, and good analysis saved the Free World.



